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1 Garré refers to the number of annual intentional 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, as recorded by the 
World Bank in 2012-2013, in order to illustrate and 
compare the level of violence of Honduras (92) and El 
Salvador (69)—two of the most violent countries in 
the world—to the cases of Argentina (5.5), Uruguay 
(6), and Chile (4).
2 The maras (the Central American term for gang) 
is the rising form of organized violence that is the 
scourge of El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and 
southern Mexico—increasingly expanding into Co-
lombia, Brazil, and other South American countries.
3 On 10 December 2013, the General Assembly of 
Uruguay approved a law that made the country the 
first in the world to fully regulate the cultivation, 
trade, and consumption of cannabis for medical, 
industrial, as well as recreational purposes.
4 In 2013, President Santos addressed the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and referred to the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, saying: 
“Right here, in this same headquarters, fifty-two years 
ago, the convention that gave birth to the war on 
drugs was approved. Today, we must acknowledge, 
that war has not been won. And I say this as the 
president of the country that has suffered more deaths, 
more bloodshed, and more sacrifices in this war, and 
the country that has also achieved more results in the 
fight against this scourge and the mafias that underpin 
it.” See Trotta, Daniel. “Colombian President Tells 
U.N. the Drug War Has Not Been Won.” Reuters, 24 
September 2013.
As a graduate student, his policy area of 
concentration is social and urban policy, 
focusing primarily on criminal justice topics 
in Latin America. He is particularly enthu-
siastic about public initiatives that lie at the 
intersection of public safety, technology, and 
public opinion.
The Energy Reform 
in Mexico 
Lessons and Warnings from International Law
BY GUILLERMO J. GARCIA SANCHEZ
Abstract
THE ARTICLE ANALYZES some 
of the contents of the Mexican energy 
reform of 2013 and warns on the interna-
tional legal implications that the path that 
Mexico has chosen to follow could bring 
to its economy and international relations. 
Concretely, it argues that in order to avoid 
falling into the same mistakes made by 
other Latin American countries in the re-
gion, Mexico must consider its obligations 
contained in international treaties signed 
with the United States on transboundary 
resources as well as its obligations in bilat-
eral investment treaties that protect foreign 
investors from certain government acts and 
policies.
In December 2013, the international 
media reported, to the surprise of many, 
that the Mexican Congress approved an en-
ergy reform that will radically transform a 
seventy-year-old state-oriented policy that 
was an essential part of Mexico’s national 
identity.1 The central theme of this article 
is to analyze some of the contents of this 
reform and to make a cautious warning on 
some of the international legal implications 
that the path that Mexico has chosen to 
follow could bring to its economy and to its 
international relations. Concretely, the ar-
ticle argues that the legislative process that 
will implement the energy reform in the 
upcoming months needs to attend to two 
elements regarding Mexico’s international 
legal obligations: the provisions contained 
in the 2012 Agreement Between the United 
States of America and Mexico Concerning 
Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in 
the Gulf of Mexico (the 2012 Treaty)2 and 
the obligations contained in several bilat-
eral investment treaties (BITs) signed by 
Mexico that protect foreign investors from 
certain government acts and policies. Oth-
er states in the region have gone down this 
path before and for a diversity of reasons 
have ignored the international obligations 
to which they agreed, triggering numerous 
disputes and conflicts that eventually cost 
LATIN AMERICA POLICY JOURNAL     spring 2014 9190
POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS The Energy Reform in Mexico
millions in damages and compensations. 
Mexico has the chance to learn from the 
mistakes of its peers in the region and even 
to be institutionally creative in the way it 
assumes its international obligations in 
the future; otherwise, the story of States 
repenting years later will repeat itself, to the 
detriment of Mexico’s national finances. 
The Energy Reform of 2013
Before addressing the international law 
aspect of the reform, it is important to un-
derstand the essence of the constitutional 
amendment.3 The most important aspect 
in relation to this article is the fact that 
the energy reform amended the Mexican 
Constitution to open up the possibility for 
the Mexican State to sign contracts with 
private parties, including multinationals, 
for the exploration and exploitation of hy-
drocarbon resources (article 27). Before the 
reform, only Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), 
the State-owned petroleum company, could 
conduct these activities on behalf of the 
State. The Constitution still prohibits the 
signing of concession agreements, but in 
the transitory articles, it allows the State to 
sign a variety of contracts that were forbid-
den before. For example, the reform affirms 
that the State can sign joint profit and pro-
duction contracts, service contracts, and 
licenses with private companies (transitory 
provision 4). The transitory provisions 
also mention that the State can pay the 
private party: cash, in the case of service 
contracts; a percentage of the profit, in the 
case of joint profit agreements; a percent-
age of the production, for joint production 
agreements; and an onerous transfer of the 
hydrocarbons once they have been extract-
ed, for the license agreements; or a combi-
nation of all of the above. The decision on 
which contract will be adopted according 
to the reform depends on the one that will 
maximize the government’s income in the 
long term. In terms of the authorities in 
charge of implementing the reform, the 
Secretary of Energy, the National Com-
mission on Hydrocarbons, and the Energy 
Regulatory Commission have joint powers 
to execute and regulate different aspects of 
the agreements (article 27 and transitory 
provisions 6 and 10). 
The 2012 Treaty Between Mexico 
and the United States
In December 2013, just a couple of 
days after the Mexican Congress adopted 
the energy reform, the U.S. Congress ap-
proved as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act 
of 2013 the integration of the Agreement 
Between the United States and Mexico 
Concerning the Transboundary Hydro-
carbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico.4 
With this act, the treaty that took more 
than twenty years to negotiate and was 
signed in 2012 entered into force between 
both countries and regulates the resources 
that, according to international law, both 
States are entitled to exploit.5 The treaty, 
in essence, will change the way the energy 
relations between Mexico and the United 
States can develop in the future since 
it opens the possibility of exploiting an 
estimate of 172 million barrels contained 
in deep water reservoirs.6 Furthermore, 
it places the security of the hydrocarbon 
resources located in the Gulf of Mexico un-
der the protection of an international treaty 
and fosters a joint development between 
Mexico and the United States to exploit 
them efficiently, equitably, and in a secure 
way. There are many aspects of the treaty 
that are interesting for the development of 
international law in the matter, but for the 
sake of this article, four points are relevant 
and need to be stressed to avoid future 
conflicts between both States.
First, the treaty’s heart and soul is 
located in its preamble, where it states the 
principles that will guide the life of the legal 
framework of the treaty to archive “safe, 
efficient, equitable and environmentally 
responsible exploitation of transboundary 
hydrocarbon reservoirs.” The treaty does 
not expand on what the parties consider 
to be an “efficient,” “equitable,” “safe,” or 
“environmentally responsible” exploitation, 
hence it leaves open to interpretation how 
these principles might develop in the life of 
the treaty. This has several risks in light of 
the energy reform: for example, by not de-
termining the understanding of each prin-
ciple and by not hierarchizing them, the 
operators of the agreement, or an arbitrator 
if a dispute arises, will have to interpret 
each one and balance them in case there is 
conflict. What if the unitization agreement 
is efficient but not safe or environmentally 
responsible? What if it is equitable but 
inefficient? And even more important for 
the sake of the energy reform, what if the 
domestic legislation in Mexico defines ef-
ficiency in terms of government revenues 
and not in terms of profitability to the 
private contractors? The answers cannot be 
obtained from the language drafted in the 
treaty and hence are left subject to interpre-
tation.  
Second, to achieve the above-men-
tioned principles, Mexico and the United 
States agreed that the treaty would design 
“cooperative agreements based primarily 
on principles of unitization.” Articles 6 and 
7 of the treaty establish the process to sign 
and the content of the unitization agree-
ments. In essence, they must be negotiated 
by the licensees from each side of the bor-
der treating the reservoir as a unit, which 
entails that the States must share the costs 
and the profits of its exploitation equitably. 
In addition, the unitization contracts pro-
posed by the licensees must be approved 
by each of the State agencies. This raises 
several questions in the face of the energy 
reform. The regulatory framework of the 
reform must include a chapter that deals 
with the contracts in the borderline with 
the United States. The way things stand 
today, it is unclear the type of contractual 
relationship that the Mexican government 
could have with private companies in 
those areas that could respect the agree-
ment signed with the United States. The 
treaty only mentions one type of contract: 
licenses. But the Mexican legislation, as 
explained above, contains several options, 
and each one, according to the reform, 
must maximize in the long term the gov-
ernment’s profit from the exploitation of 
these resources. Balancing the rights of the 
State, the rights of the contractors, and the 
provisions of unification in the treaty is go-
ing to be a hard task and must be addressed 
in the secondary legislation if the Mexican 
State wants to avoid a dispute with the 
United States on the issue. 
Finally, the dispute resolution mecha-
nisms of the treaty are far from efficient. 
For instance, the treaty created a Joint 
Commission to determine many elements 
of the life of the treaty, including resolving 
disputes regarding its interpretation. This, 
however, does not make the Commission 
a strong and independent body; in fact, 
it’s the opposite. The members of the Joint 
Commission are designated by the parties, 
but there are no qualification requirements 
regarding them; the Commission is com-
posed of four members, two designated 
by each State, and does not contain any 
procedure in case its decisions are locked. 
In the case the Commission is unable to 
reach an agreement in many aspects of 
the treaty, the issue is thrown back to the 
parties or to an arbitrator—only if it’s a 
technical issue it is resolved by an expert. 
Finally, the Commission does not have an 
independent budget and each State has to 
financially support its designated members. 
Hence, as opposed to being an independent 
and strong body that could make unbiased 
decisions on the benefit of the treaty’s life, 
the Joint Commission is closer to a bina-
tional political commission that tries to co-
ordinate policies but has almost no power 
over the parties. Mexico and the United 
States have done better in the past when it 
comes to creating this type of organism. In 
fact, in a very similar situation, the case of 
transboundary rivers, both States signed an 
agreement back in 1944 where they created 
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millions in damages and compensations. 
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the future; otherwise, the story of States 
repenting years later will repeat itself, to the 
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Before addressing the international law 
aspect of the reform, it is important to un-
derstand the essence of the constitutional 
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in relation to this article is the fact that 
the energy reform amended the Mexican 
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private parties, including multinationals, 
for the exploration and exploitation of hy-
drocarbon resources (article 27). Before the 
reform, only Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), 
the State-owned petroleum company, could 
conduct these activities on behalf of the 
State. The Constitution still prohibits the 
signing of concession agreements, but in 
the transitory articles, it allows the State to 
sign a variety of contracts that were forbid-
den before. For example, the reform affirms 
that the State can sign joint profit and pro-
duction contracts, service contracts, and 
licenses with private companies (transitory 
provision 4). The transitory provisions 
also mention that the State can pay the 
private party: cash, in the case of service 
contracts; a percentage of the profit, in the 
case of joint profit agreements; a percent-
age of the production, for joint production 
agreements; and an onerous transfer of the 
hydrocarbons once they have been extract-
ed, for the license agreements; or a combi-
nation of all of the above. The decision on 
which contract will be adopted according 
to the reform depends on the one that will 
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long term. In terms of the authorities in 
charge of implementing the reform, the 
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to execute and regulate different aspects of 
the agreements (article 27 and transitory 
provisions 6 and 10). 
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proved as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act 
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Concerning the Transboundary Hydro-
carbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico.4 
With this act, the treaty that took more 
than twenty years to negotiate and was 
signed in 2012 entered into force between 
both countries and regulates the resources 
that, according to international law, both 
States are entitled to exploit.5 The treaty, 
in essence, will change the way the energy 
relations between Mexico and the United 
States can develop in the future since 
it opens the possibility of exploiting an 
estimate of 172 million barrels contained 
in deep water reservoirs.6 Furthermore, 
it places the security of the hydrocarbon 
resources located in the Gulf of Mexico un-
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and fosters a joint development between 
Mexico and the United States to exploit 
them efficiently, equitably, and in a secure 
way. There are many aspects of the treaty 
that are interesting for the development of 
international law in the matter, but for the 
sake of this article, four points are relevant 
and need to be stressed to avoid future 
conflicts between both States.
First, the treaty’s heart and soul is 
located in its preamble, where it states the 
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framework of the treaty to archive “safe, 
efficient, equitable and environmentally 
responsible exploitation of transboundary 
hydrocarbon reservoirs.” The treaty does 
not expand on what the parties consider 
to be an “efficient,” “equitable,” “safe,” or 
“environmentally responsible” exploitation, 
hence it leaves open to interpretation how 
these principles might develop in the life of 
the treaty. This has several risks in light of 
the energy reform: for example, by not de-
termining the understanding of each prin-
ciple and by not hierarchizing them, the 
operators of the agreement, or an arbitrator 
if a dispute arises, will have to interpret 
each one and balance them in case there is 
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responsible? What if it is equitable but 
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ficiency in terms of government revenues 
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obtained from the language drafted in the 
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tation.  
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States agreed that the treaty would design 
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7 of the treaty establish the process to sign 
and the content of the unitization agree-
ments. In essence, they must be negotiated 
by the licensees from each side of the bor-
der treating the reservoir as a unit, which 
entails that the States must share the costs 
and the profits of its exploitation equitably. 
In addition, the unitization contracts pro-
posed by the licensees must be approved 
by each of the State agencies. This raises 
several questions in the face of the energy 
reform. The regulatory framework of the 
reform must include a chapter that deals 
with the contracts in the borderline with 
the United States. The way things stand 
today, it is unclear the type of contractual 
relationship that the Mexican government 
could have with private companies in 
those areas that could respect the agree-
ment signed with the United States. The 
treaty only mentions one type of contract: 
licenses. But the Mexican legislation, as 
explained above, contains several options, 
and each one, according to the reform, 
must maximize in the long term the gov-
ernment’s profit from the exploitation of 
these resources. Balancing the rights of the 
State, the rights of the contractors, and the 
provisions of unification in the treaty is go-
ing to be a hard task and must be addressed 
in the secondary legislation if the Mexican 
State wants to avoid a dispute with the 
United States on the issue. 
Finally, the dispute resolution mecha-
nisms of the treaty are far from efficient. 
For instance, the treaty created a Joint 
Commission to determine many elements 
of the life of the treaty, including resolving 
disputes regarding its interpretation. This, 
however, does not make the Commission 
a strong and independent body; in fact, 
it’s the opposite. The members of the Joint 
Commission are designated by the parties, 
but there are no qualification requirements 
regarding them; the Commission is com-
posed of four members, two designated 
by each State, and does not contain any 
procedure in case its decisions are locked. 
In the case the Commission is unable to 
reach an agreement in many aspects of 
the treaty, the issue is thrown back to the 
parties or to an arbitrator—only if it’s a 
technical issue it is resolved by an expert. 
Finally, the Commission does not have an 
independent budget and each State has to 
financially support its designated members. 
Hence, as opposed to being an independent 
and strong body that could make unbiased 
decisions on the benefit of the treaty’s life, 
the Joint Commission is closer to a bina-
tional political commission that tries to co-
ordinate policies but has almost no power 
over the parties. Mexico and the United 
States have done better in the past when it 
comes to creating this type of organism. In 
fact, in a very similar situation, the case of 
transboundary rivers, both States signed an 
agreement back in 1944 where they created 
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a commission with the rank of an “interna-
tional organization” that has a joint budget 
to technically determine apportionment of 
inland water between both countries.7 This 
binational organization has been relatively 
efficient in its tasks and has been able to 
work even under pressure of governors, 
mayors, and farmers on both sides of the 
border.8
The Protection of Foreign Investors 
in Mexico
Mexico has signed more than thirty 
bilateral investment treaties and several 
free trade agreements that contain a sec-
tion on the protection of investment, like 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, where in essence 
the State agrees to give foreign investors a 
particular set of rights and legal resources.9 
In general, these include the right to a fair 
and equitable treatment, principles on the 
procedure and calculation of compensa-
tion for expropriations, nondiscrimination, 
national treatment, and full protection 
and security of their investment.10 Most 
importantly these treaties give the right to 
the foreign investor to initiate mandatory 
arbitration proceedings against the govern-
ment if the investor considers that his or 
her rights have been violated due to state 
action or inaction. Mexico has been found 
guilty in the past for certain acts against 
foreign investors and has paid a substantial 
amount of money in damages and compen-
sation.11 Nevertheless, one of the industries 
that was excluded from these treaties was 
the hydrocarbon sector. This is so because 
it was considered that only Pemex would 
develop activities in these areas and that 
foreign investment was expressly forbidden 
in this area. 
With the entry into force of both the 
treaty of 2012 and the energy reform of 
2013, questions will emerge regarding the 
protection of the investors that will be sub-
ject to both regimes. In principle, interna-
tional foreign investment law protects the 
contracts signed by the investors with the 
government.12 These are considered as any 
other investment in the foreign country. 
The risk with the energy reform now is that 
if the secondary legislation is not drafted 
in an efficient way, clearly establishing the 
type of acts that the government can take—
such as forcing a unification agreement in 
the borderline, for instance—international 
disputes could arise in the future. For 
example, if a petroleum company agrees 
to invest in Mexico under certain terms, 
and the government decides to correct the 
agreement to regain control of the produc-
tion of the field or it modifies the legal con-
text in which the investment was done in 
the future, then Mexico could face claims 
in an international investment arbitral 
tribunal. This has happened in the past to 
other countries in the region. It is not un-
common to find stories of Latin American 
governments that decide to open particular 
sectors of the economy that were previ-
ously fully controlled by the State and then 
change their minds years later when they 
realize that the reforms are too aggressive 
and that they left the government on the 
wrong side of the equation. Any amend-
ments to the legislative and contractual 
context when the foreign investor arrived 
to the State can be translated into claims 
of breaches of a BIT and hence the State 
would have to pay damages and compensa-
tion for modifying its policies. Examples 
of the above can be found in the case of 
Ecuador when it modified its fiscal law 
on the exploitation of hydrocarbons13 and 
Venezuela when it modified its national 
hydrocarbons law to strengthen the control 
of the State over the exploitation of the oil 
fields in the Orinoco Belt.14 
Conclusion 
If the purpose of the 2012 treaty and 
the 2013 energy reform is to expand the 
investment in the hydrocarbon sector of 
Mexico, then a deep study and understand-
ing of the international law implications of 
these innovations is necessary. The risk of 
making a mistake or of being too ambigu-
ous regarding the policies adopted and the 
legislation implemented could provoke 
several claims and years of costly litigation 
with the U.S. government or with foreign 
investors. This story has been told before in 
the region, there is no need to replicate it 
in Mexico if things are done appropriately. 
On the contrary, if Mexico is able to draft a 
modern secondary law that integrates more 
deeply the energy relation with the United 
States and foreign companies in an ef-
ficient, equitable, and secure way, the future 
of the North American regions could be 
secured and it could serve as an excellent 
model for other relations. For example, it 
is a fact that transboundary resources are 
also located with the borders of other parts 
of the Gulf, like the borderlines between 
Mexico, the United States, and Cuba, or the 
borderline between Guatemala and Mexico. 
Furthermore, the shale gas reservoirs in 
the borderline between Mexico and the 
United States could also benefit from the 
experience that the exploitation of the 
fields according to the treaty of 2012 could 
bring.  
If things are done in an inappropriate 
manner and Mexico is forced to modify 
legal contexts after the investments are 
done or if the agreements in the borderline 
end up in claims tribunals, then the politi-
cal turmoil in Mexico when the news of the 
arbitrations are out will force the State to go 
back to nationalistic rhetoric that can only 
bring more tension to the region. Rather 
than being an example of the development 
of a secure energy region, Mexico will 
become one more case of a wrongly imple-
mented opening to foreign investment and 
a consequent fall back into nationalistic 
policies that not only keeps the State from 
using its resources efficiently but that trans-
lates into litigation that could eventually 
cost millions of dollars of national income 
in damages and compensation. 
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and the government decides to correct the 
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text in which the investment was done in 
the future, then Mexico could face claims 
in an international investment arbitral 
tribunal. This has happened in the past to 
other countries in the region. It is not un-
common to find stories of Latin American 
governments that decide to open particular 
sectors of the economy that were previ-
ously fully controlled by the State and then 
change their minds years later when they 
realize that the reforms are too aggressive 
and that they left the government on the 
wrong side of the equation. Any amend-
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of breaches of a BIT and hence the State 
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Ecuador when it modified its fiscal law 
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the region, there is no need to replicate it 
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of the North American regions could be 
secured and it could serve as an excellent 
model for other relations. For example, it 
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legal contexts after the investments are 
done or if the agreements in the borderline 
end up in claims tribunals, then the politi-
cal turmoil in Mexico when the news of the 
arbitrations are out will force the State to go 
back to nationalistic rhetoric that can only 
bring more tension to the region. Rather 
than being an example of the development 
of a secure energy region, Mexico will 
become one more case of a wrongly imple-
mented opening to foreign investment and 
a consequent fall back into nationalistic 
policies that not only keeps the State from 
using its resources efficiently but that trans-
lates into litigation that could eventually 
cost millions of dollars of national income 
in damages and compensation. 
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